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CROSSING THE LINE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF PROBLEMS WITH CLASSIFYING 
RECIDIVIST MISDEMEANOR 
OFFENSES AS FELONIES 
ANDREW KATBI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska is in the minority of states that apply felony charges based on a 
defendant’s history of misdemeanor violations. This approach to the 
challenges of criminal recidivism, however, creates both constitutional and 
prudential problems. While Alaska enjoys considerable latitude in its 
sentencing policies, this form of misdemeanor reclassification raises concerns 
about proportionality under the Eighth Amendment, double jeopardy under 
the Fifth Amendment, and poses dilemmas for participants in the plea-
bargaining process. This Note examines these problems and proposes a 
graduated approach to sentencing enhancement. By increasing punishment 
gradually and preventing recidivist misdemeanants from crossing the 
misdemeanor-felony border as quickly, Alaska could secure the benefits of 
recidivism statutes while avoiding the constitutional and prudential concerns 
present in existing law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Johnny Doe is a citizen of Alaska. He was arrested several years 
ago for driving under the influence (DUI) a couple miles from home. 
Johnny served his 72 hours in jail and paid a $1,500 fine while waiting 
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for his six-month license suspension to end.1 Years later, a police officer 
pulls Johnny’s car over and cites him once again for DUI. This time, 
however, Johnny faces a minimum of twenty days in jail, a fine of at 
least $3,000, and a one-year suspension of his license.2 Now that Johnny 
is a recidivist, his punishment has become much more severe. Not only 
does the State relabel his offense as a “felony” instead of a 
“misdemeanor”—meaning that he loses his voting rights and suffers 
other collateral consequences of a felony conviction—the State also more 
than sextuples his time in prison. While such reclassifications may be 
well-intended, they also raise a number of potential issues. 
Recidivism—when previous offenders commit additional crimes—
is one of the principal problems facing legislatures and criminal justice 
scholars. Recidivism persists in all jurisdictions.3 It has long been a 
primary factor in sentencing,4 and legislatures have tried many methods 
to reduce it. In fact, recidivist provisions appear in criminal codes at 
both the state and federal level.5 
Legislatures have responded to the recidivist problem in various 
ways. Statutory enhancements, guideline increases, and separate 
substantive offenses add to the prosecutorial menu and increase 
punishments for recidivists.6 Recidivist adjustments exist for both 
misdemeanor and felony offenses.7 Some of the most famous recidivist 
provisions include the federal criminal history guidelines,8 and 
California’s three strikes law for felony recidivists.9 However, 
 
 1.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(b)(1)(A) (2013). 
 2.  § 28.35.030(b)(1)(B). 
 3.  Forty-seven percent of prisoners are convicted of a new crime within 
three years of their release. Prisoner Recidivism Analysis Tool, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/recidivism 
/index.cfm (click “Analysis” tab; then check all boxes; then click “Generate 
Results” button). See also ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN 
ALASKA, at EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/ 
reports/1-07CriminalRecidivism.pdf (“[Sixty-six percent] of all offenders in the 
sample [all of whom were convicted of at least one felony in 1999] had been re-
incarcerated at least once [within three years of release.]”). 
 4.  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998). 
 5.  Jason White, Once, Twice, Four Times a Felon: North Carolina’s 
Unconstitutional Recidivist Statutes, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 115, 116 (2001). 
 6.  See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of 
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1144, 1191 
n.281 (2010) (noting the existence of all three forms of legislative response). 
 7.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 2011) (imposing a recidivist 
increase on misdemeanor petty theft); § 666.5 (imposing a recidivist increase on 
felony theft). 
 8.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2013). 
 9.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 
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legislatures also craft provisions for misdemeanor recidivists.10 While 
some states establish an additional misdemeanor offense for 
recidivists,11 Alaska has taken a more aggressive approach. The state has 
added provisions that reclassify underlying misdemeanor violations as 
felonies when specific recidivist conditions are satisfied. Alaska has 
established this recidivist reclassification for assault,12 theft,13 vehicle 
theft,14 and DUI.15 
While Alaska amplifies the punishment for repeated misdemeanors 
with worthy intentions, it may be causing more harm than good. The 
statutes certainly reflect the long-standing belief that recidivists are 
more deserving of punishment.16 These statutes also undoubtedly 
incapacitate recidivists, both through incarceration17 and harsher post-
conviction consequences.18 But this Author is aware of no studies 
performed in Alaska showing that the harsher punishments established 
by the statutes have contributed to a drop in recidivism rates.19 
 
 10.  See, e.g., § 666 (imposing a recidivist increase on misdemeanor petty 
theft). 
 11.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2013) (creating a Class H felony 
violation for a person guilty of two or more previous assault violations). 
 12.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220(a)(5) (2011). 
 13.  § 11.46.130(a)(6). 
 14.  § 11.46.360(a)(4). 
 15.  § 28.35.030(n). 
 16.  Michael Edmund O’Neill et al., Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism 
and Culpability, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 246 (2004). 
 17.  Recidivists often receive longer prison terms. See § 12.55.125(a)(2) 
(providing a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years for repeat murderers); 
§ 12.55.135(g) (providing a minimum term for repeat domestic violence 
offenders); NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMMISSION, 
NORTH CAROLINA FELONY PUNISHMENT CHART (2011), available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents 
/FelonyChart_12_01_11MaxChart.pdf [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA FELONY 
PUNISHMENT CHART (2011)] (providing longer presumptive sentencing ranges for 
repeat offenders). 
 18.  See infra notes 49–60. 
 19.  Indeed, the only support for these recidivist statutes appears to be a mix 
of historical precedent and logical assumption. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 
(1992) (“Statutes that punish recidivists more severely than first offenders have a 
long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial times.”). The Supreme 
Court has explained the rationale supporting recidivist statutes generally as 
follows: “Its primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and . . . to segregate 
them from the rest of society for an extended period of time . . . based . . . on the 
propensities that he [or she] has demonstrated over a period of time.” Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980). Meanwhile, recidivism rates remain high in 
Alaska. A 2007 study by the Alaska Judicial Council found that sixty-six percent 
of offenders come back into the system, with forty-eight percent of these 
returning within a year of release. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 11. 
In 2011, a Pew Center study found that Alaska had the sixth-highest recidivism 
rate in the United States and the highest rate of prisoners returning because of 
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Furthermore, there is evidence that other states’ recidivist provisions 
have not had a deterrent effect.20 Given that the statutes increase the 
incarcerated population as well as the costs related to incarceration and 
post-sentence supervision,21 the lack of evidence showing any deterrent 
effect is concerning. 
Perhaps more ominous, these statutes may impose harsh 
punishments on the wrong populations. By creating such a large gap 
between a stand-alone misdemeanor violation and its felony recidivist 
counterpart, the statutes may actually increase acquittals among the 
most culpable defendants while forcing guilty pleas out of questionable 
defendants who give up their chance to face a trial’s adversarial 
structure.22 Prosecutors maintain a heavy bargaining chip, wielding the 
threat of felony incarceration and its collateral consequences against the 
defendant.23 The weight of this bargaining chip gives prosecutors 
significant leverage in initial plea negotiations; however, prosecutors are 
left with no middle ground. To compromise, they have to drop the 
charges from a felony to a stand-alone misdemeanor violation. This cliff 
creates inefficiencies in the plea bargaining process, pools defendants 
into three over-inclusive groups, and could coerce innocent defendants 
into plea bargains out of fear of a possible felony conviction.24 
 
new crimes (rather than technical violations of release conditions). Chris Kling, 
Study Finds High Alaska Recidivism Rates, KTUU (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://articles.ktuu.com/2011-04-13/prisoners_29415459. 
 20.  See Sara J. Lewis, The Cruel and Unusual Reality of California’s Three Strikes 
Law: Ewing v. California and the Narrowing of the Eighth Amendment’s 
Proportionality Principle, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 542–43 & n.241 (2003) (noting 
that California’s three strikes statute has not resulted in any significant drop in 
crime rates). 
 21.  See, e.g., House Bill 75, ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 19th Leg. (Feb. 22, 
1996) (statement of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Attorney General, Department of 
Law) (estimating that HB 75 would result in additional costs). See also Andrew 
D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. SAINT 
THOMAS L.J. 536, 537 (2006) (calculating the cost of additional incarceration in the 
federal system). 
 22.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 23.  For example, a stand-alone violation of section 11.41.230 of the Alaska 
Statutes would be a Class A misdemeanor with a punishment of zero to one year 
of incarceration. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230(b) (2011) (establishing assault in 
the fourth degree as a class A misdemeanor); § 12.55.135(a) (requiring 
imprisonment of less than one year for a class A misdemeanor). If the violation 
is brought under section 11.41.220(a)(5) of the Alaska Statutes, the defendant 
will be charged with a Class C felony with a punishment of up to five years of 
incarceration plus felony consequences. See § 11.41.220(e) (establishing assault in 
the third degree as a class C felony); § 12.55.125 (requiring imprisonment of less 
than five years for a class C felony). 
 24.  See infra Part II.A. See also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2507 (2004) (“The decision to go to trial is 
a gamble . . . . In negotiations, risk-averse people prefer sure settlements . . . .”); 
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Furthermore, the statutes themselves may push up against the Eighth 
Amendment’s proportionality principle25 and the Fifth Amendment’s 
Double Jeopardy Clause,26 exposing the statutes to attacks on 
constitutional grounds. 
The first section of this Note will begin by taking a close look at 
Alaska’s novel approach to misdemeanor recidivist sentencing. It will 
also review the reasoning behind increased penalties for recidivists. 
Section II will explore the pooling and bargaining problems these 
statutes create, as well as how they threaten to undermine the criminal 
burden-of-proof requirements and decrease the efficiency of criminal 
litigation. This section will also examine the potential constitutional 
challenges that could be levied against the Alaska statutes. Finally, the 
last section proposes a solution that will avoid or mitigate 
these problems, while still fulfilling the purpose of recidivist 
enhancements. 
I. ALASKA’S APPROACH TO MISDEMEANOR RECIDIVISM 
Criminal history is one of the primary bases “for a sentencing 
court[] increasing an offender’s sentence.”27 After the court determines a 
defendant’s history, guidelines and statutes apply recidivist increases to 
augment their sentence.28 
The primary goals of recidivist provisions are to deter and 
incapacitate repeat offenders, thereby protecting the public.29 Criminal 
laws add a price to unwanted conduct—punishment—in an attempt to 
prevent actors from performing that conduct. Some scholars have 
justified recidivist provisions by claiming the original price was not 
enough to deter the offenders from the undesirable conduct and higher 
punishments are necessary for those specific individuals.30 These price 
increases supposedly provide general deterrence to the public as well.31 
 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, 
and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) (“If . . . innocent 
defendants as a class are significantly more risk averse than guilty defendants as 
a class, a prosecutor’s failure to internalize a defendant’s private information 
will cost the prosecutor nothing because the defendant, even if innocent, will 
take the deal anyway.”). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 27.  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998). 
 28.  Russell, supra note 6, at 1144. 
 29.  White, supra note 5 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)); 
see Leipold, supra note 21, at 542 (“[T]hose in prison don’t commit any new 
crimes except against guards and other inmates.”). 
 30.  E.g., O’Neill et al., supra note 16. 
 31.  Russell, supra note 6, at 1153. 
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Indeed, as the Alaska Supreme Court has explained: 
Habitual criminal statutes are founded on the general principle 
that persistent offenders should be subject to greater sanctions 
than those who have been convicted only once. These statutes 
serve as a warning to first time offenders and provide them 
with an opportunity to reform. It is only upon subsequent 
convictions for repeated criminal conduct that increasingly 
stiffer sentences are imposed. The reason the sanctions become 
increasingly severe is not so much that the defendant has 
sinned more than once, but that he is deemed incorrigible when 
he persists in violations of the law after conviction of previous 
infractions.32 
Recidivists are also considered more culpable offenders because 
they are on notice and have experience with the justice system.33 
Furthermore, criminal history is one of the strongest predictors of future 
criminal acts.34 
In light of these justifications,35 various states have addressed the 
misdemeanor recidivist problem by creating felony offenses to 
augment36 or replace37 the original underlying misdemeanors. Alaska 
courts have explained that their legislature was motivated by at least 
four different goals in enacting the state’s recidivism regime, including 
improved public safety, reducing repeat offenses, providing clear and 
easily-understood penalties, and restoring public trust in the criminal 
 
 32.  State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Alaska 1977) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Wooley v. State, 221 P.3d 12, 15 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2009) (citing and applying Carlson in the context of Alaska’s 
misdemeanor upgrade statutes). 
 33.  See O’Neill et al., supra note 16, at 247 (noting first-time offenders’ “lack 
of familiarity with the criminal justice system”); Aaron J. Rappaport, 
Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 596–97 (noting that a recidivist criminal “acts with 
full awareness” of the consequences of his conduct). 
 34.  Rappaport, supra note 33, at 590–91 & n.110. 
 35.  See Eberhardt v. State, 275 P.3d 560, 566–67 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (“The 
legislature determined that a person who commits three offenses within a ten-
year period is a particularly dangerous offender who deserves enhanced 
punishment.”) (Coats, J., dissenting). See also Wooley, 221 P.3d at 19 (noting the 
legislature’s goals when enacting the three-strikes law were the traditional goals 
of (1) improving public safety; (2) reducing the number of serious, repeat 
offenders; (3) setting proper and simplified sentencing practices; and (4) 
restoring public trust in our criminal justice system). 
 36.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2013) (augmenting an assault charge with 
a Class H felony). 
 37.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220(a)(5) (2011) (replacing the original Class A 
misdemeanor with a Class C felony). 
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justice system.38 In Alaska, misdemeanor assault,39 theft,40 vehicle theft,41 
and DUI42 become felonies after the second or third separate conviction 
in a five- to ten-year period, depending on the offense. In pertinent 
parts, the Alaska statutes provide that a person who commits the 
specified misdemeanor, and who has previously been convicted of one 
of a set of listed crimes, can be punished under a new felony offense. 
Similarly, in North Carolina, a separate substantive felony offense can be 
charged against a person who has committed misdemeanor assault or 
theft and has two or more prior convictions of assault or theft within the 
preceding fifteen years.43 
This jump in punishment for non-traffic related offenses is a new 
and relatively rare method of punishing misdemeanor recidivists.44 But 
the stage is set: misdemeanor violations, once only punishable by a 
maximum of one year in jail,45 can now trigger felony charges and 
consequences if the criminal history conditions are satisfied. 
II. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ALASKA’S 
CLASSIFICATION OF RECIDIVIST MISDEMEANOR 
OFFENSES 
This unique reclassification instantly implicates the felony-
misdemeanor distinction. This distinction has been described as “[t]he 
most important classification of crime in general use in the United 
States.”46 States generally rely on the distinction to scale their laws and 
 
 38.  Wooley, 221 P.3d at 19. 
 39.  § 11.41.220(a)(5). 
 40.  § 11.46.130(a)(6). 
 41.  § 11.46.360(a)(4). 
 42.  § 28.35.030(n). 
 43.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2013). 
 44.  Although all fifty states have adopted some type of recidivist 
punishment regime, White, supra note 5, the most common approach is to enact 
so-called “three strikes laws” that punish multiple felony convictions. The 
Alaska approach of upgrading multiple misdemeanor offenses into a felony 
conviction is uncommon outside of the traffic offense context, though not 
unheard of. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.03 (2013) (creating a third-degree felony for 
a person guilty of two or more batteries, aggravated batteries, or felony 
batteries). By contrast, most states upgrade misdemeanor traffic offenses, like 
driving under the influence of alcohol, to felonies after a certain number 
offenses. See infra note 136 and accompanying text (listing states which upgrade 
misdemeanor traffic offenses to felonies). 
 45.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135 (2011) (“A defendant convicted of a 
class A misdemeanor may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of 
not more than one year.”). 
 46.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 34 (4th ed. 2003). 
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punishments.47 While misdemeanors are seen as minor infractions,48 
felonies are considered serious offenses and can leave a stigma for life.49 
Felony convictions result in longer prison sentences,50 harsher pre-trial 
sanctions,51 and more invasive post-sentence supervision.52 Felons 
struggle in the marketplace when hunting for jobs, housing, credit, and 
relationships.53 Other consequences include disenfranchisement;54 
prohibition from acquiring professional licenses;55 exclusion from the 
purchase and ownership of firearms;56 ineligibility from sitting on a 
jury;57 ineligibility for government assistance, welfare, and federally-
funded housing;58 the establishment of grounds for uncontested 
divorce;59 and, for non-citizens, even deportation.60 
While this article takes no position on the merits of these collateral 
consequences per se, the punishment must fit the crime.61 When the 
 
 47.  Sameer Bajaj, Policing the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of 
Warrantless Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 346 
& n.253 (2009). 
 48.  See LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 34–36 (describing the key differences 
between felonies and misdemeanors, with the latter carrying less severe 
penalties). 
 49.  See C. William Ralston, An Act of Criminal “Skullduggery”?: A Critical 
Analysis of the Circuit Split Resolved in United States v. Abuelhawa, 112 W. VA. L. 
REV. 1023, 1042–44 (2010). 
 50.  George C. Thomas III, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 195, 212 (1991). 
 51.  Kirsten Howe, Criminal Nonsupport and a Proposal for an Effective Felony-
Misdemeanor Distinction, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1075, 1090 (1986). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (disenfranchising some felons); 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.80.010 (2011) (defining the term used to disenfranchise 
felons); Christopher R. Murray, Felon Disenfranchisement in Alaska and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 289–98 (2006) (describing how “Alaska 
limits the voting rights of felons”). 
 55.  See, e.g., § 21.27.410(a)(7) (permitting the denial of insurance licenses to 
those who have been convicted of a felony). 
 56.  See, e.g., § 11.61.200(a)(1) (criminalizing possession of a firearm capable 
of concealment after being convicted of a felony). 
 57.  See, e.g., § 09.20.020 (“A person is disqualified from serving as a juror if 
the person . . . has been convicted of a felony for which the person has not been 
unconditionally discharged . . . .”). 
 58.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(4)(A)(ii) (2012) (providing a maximum of 
thirty days before a lease must be terminated after a felony conviction). See also 
Ralston, supra note 49, at 1043–44 (noting that food stamps and Social Security 
benefits can be stripped). 
 59.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(3) (allowing divorce grounded on a 
felony conviction). 
 60.  Ralston, supra note 49, at 1044. 
 61.  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (“[P]unishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”). 
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default punishment is high, and when there is no bridge between 
possible punishments on the prosecutorial menu, plea bargaining, 
burden of proof, and proportionality difficulties arise.62 The Alaska 
recidivist misdemeanor reclassifications create cliff effects in the 
prosecutorial landscape, causing over-inclusive defendant pooling, plea 
bargaining inefficiency, and proportionality concerns.63 The State’s 
burden of proof and the defendant’s presumption of innocence are 
damaged because the prosecutorial menu provides a heavy initial threat 
for the prosecutor but leaves him no efficient, smooth slope upon which 
he can negotiate the sentence. Instead, he is forced to negotiate around 
the cliff, anchoring his negotiation with a threatened felony and its 
consequences, but then falling immediately down to the stand-alone 
misdemeanor violation.64 Proportionality is implicated when the 
traditional misdemeanor violations are elevated to felony offenses and 
carry with them the numerous collateral consequences.65 Reclassifying a 
new offense purely out of recidivist elements also creates double 
jeopardy concerns.66 
A.  Defendant Pooling, Plea Bargaining, and the Burden of Proof 
Plea bargaining remains a controversial subject in Alaska and its 
role in sentencing for the most serious felonies remains in flux.67 
 
 62.  See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 63.  See infra Part II.A. 
 64.  For example, an Alaska prosecutor can bring charges under section 
11.41.230 of the Alaska Statutes, which would be a class A misdemeanor with 
zero to one year of incarceration, or charge the recidivist upgrade under section 
11.41.220(a)(5) of the Alaska Statutes, which would be a class C felony, 
providing a presumptive sentence of two years’ incarceration and as many as 
five years, depending on prior criminal history, plus felony collateral 
consequences. There is no in between option. As a parallel example, take the 
case of Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1985), where “[t]he Marion 
County prosecutor added this habitual offender count to the pending theft 
charge after plea bargaining attempts with Baker proved unsuccessful . . . .” Id. 
at 303–04. Baker was convicted of theft and the jury found that he was a habitual 
offender. Id. the court therefore enhanced his sentence. Id. 
 65.  See infra discussion of collateral consequences in Part II. 
 66.  See Harold Dubroff, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 332, 348 
(1965) (“Possible constitutional problems are created by recidivist statutes 
inasmuch as the defendant has already been punished for his prior crimes.”). 
 67.  The Alaska Attorney General’s own shifting positions on plea 
bargaining are emblematic of the ambivalence toward this issue. Prior to 1975, 
plea bargaining was “fully institutionalized” in Alaska. Michael Rubinstein & 
Teresa White, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 L. SOC. REV. 367, 367 (1979). 
According to a report prepared by the Alaska Judicial Council, lawyers believed 
that “unless it was crystal clear that you had a client who maintained his 
innocence—you went to the D.A. to see what could be worked out.” MICHAEL L. 
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However, plea bargaining has played an overwhelmingly large role in 
Alaskan criminal law.68 According to the 2012 Alaska Court System 
Annual Report, 4,892 out of the 6,623 felony cases were disposed of via 
plea bargains.69 “The principle that there is a presumption of innocence 
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, 
and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law.”70 This foundational principle forms the basis for all 
criminal trials. To avoid this heavy burden and save on litigation costs 
and resources, prosecutors offer plea bargains.71 The bargains typically 
offer reduced charges in exchange for a guilty plea.72 Defendants 
negotiate toward an agreeable settlement in the “shadow” of their 
impending trial.73 Both parties work together to find a settlement that is 
mutually satisfying, given the evidence, charges, and trial costs.74 
The “shadow of trial” theory purports that litigants “bargain 
 
RUBINSTEIN ET AL., THE EFFECT OF THE OFFICIAL PROHIBITION OF PLEA BARGAINING 
ON THE DISPOSITION OF FELONY CASES IN THE ALASKA CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (1978). 
However, in 1975, Alaska’s Attorney General banned plea bargaining by its 
prosecutors. Id. at 1. Attorney General Gross justified the ban on the grounds 
that it promoted public confidence in the justice system and created a system 
wherein people could be fairly charged. Id. at 15–17. But despite the official ban, 
“charge bargaining” continued to occur. Id. at 19. However, Alaska’s current 
Attorney General, Michael Geraghty, announced a slight change in policy in 
2013. Michelle Boots, State Puts an End to Sentencing Deals in Serious Crimes, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 23, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/ 
07/23/2987774/law-department-puts-an-end-to.html. This change does not 
affect the present analysis because his office merely announced that it would no 
longer make deals with defendants about the length of jail time they would 
receive for most serious classes of felonies and cases involving sexual assault. Id. 
 68.  In 1974, for example, roughly ninety-four percent of criminal cases were 
resolved by plea bargaining. Alaska Plea Bargaining Ban Successful, THE LEDGER, 
May 18, 1978, at 8B. 
 69.  ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 89 tbls.4.18 & 4.19 
(2012), available at http://courts.alaska.gov/reports/annualrep-fy12.pdf. 
 70.  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
 71.  Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 703 (2002) (“[I]n 
some cases defendants who might be acquitted after trial plead guilty to 
relatively minor offenses because the cost of defense exceeds seemingly minimal 
penalties and consequences.”); Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“The latest data available 
indicates that approximately 95% of all adjudicated felony criminal charges are 
disposed with through guilty pleas.”). 
 72.  Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in 
Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (1980) (“In plea bargaining, the state 
attempts to induce defendants to plead guilty by threatening to impose a 
harsher sentence should they be convicted at trial than it would impose if they 
pleaded guilty.”). 
 73.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2464. 
 74.  Id.; Covey, supra note 71. 
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toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes” by 
“forecast[ing] the expected trial outcome and strik[ing] bargains that 
leave both sides better off.”75 A perfectly rational defendant facing 
criminal charges will weigh the punishment awaiting him if convicted at 
trial against his chance of conviction. If his expected value of 
punishment76 in trial is higher than the expected value of punishment 
through a plea bargain, he will always take the plea, regardless of his 
culpability.77 The prosecutor faces his own calculus—he will weigh the 
time, effort, and value of fully punishing given the chance of conviction 
in court against the value of a bargained punishment.78 When the 
calculus favors a bargain for both parties, the case settles. 
Murder cases provide the purest example of this bargaining. 
Prosecutors generally pursue these cases when feasible,79 likely in part 
due to the stirring facts and general public outcry. Because a high 
percentage of these cases are pursued, a high percentage of them go to 
trial.80 Prosecutors in these publicized, grisly cases chase the highest 
penalties.81 Thus, the settlement curves are accurately calculated, and 
plea bargains “fall squarely in the law’s shadow” based on the expected 
trial outcomes.82 
However, plea bargaining calculus is not an exact science. While 
pure theory predicts that all charged defendants should agree to some 
reasonable plea based on their forecasted trial,83 many factors can distort 
rational plea bargaining calculations. These factors include the time 
value of liberty;84 imperfect heuristics;85 overconfidence;86 denial;87 poor 
 
 75.  Covey, supra note 71, at 74 n.1 (quoting Bibas, supra note 24, at 2464). 
 76.  The expected value of punishment is a defendant’s presumptive 
punishment multiplied by the chance of receiving that punishment. 
 77.  See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 143, 146 (2011) (“The practice of plea bargaining—granting a 
benefit to the defendant in exchange for the waiver of certain trial and appellate 
rights—provides an incentive to plead guilty.”). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563 (2004). 
 80.  See id. (“In murder cases, prosecutors generally pursue every case they 
can, which is why the acquittal rate in such cases is so much higher than for 
felonies generally.”). 
 81.  See id. (“Then too, prosecutors probably try to maximize punishment in 
murder cases—not counting death sentences—partly because the public wants 
the harshest possible punishment in those cases, and partly because the 
prosecutors themselves believe it just.”). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See Covey, supra note 71 (citing Bibas, supra note 24, at 2464) (noting that 
in theory both innocent and guilty defendants “almost always act rationally by 
pleading guilty rather than contesting guilt at trial”). 
 84.  See Gilchrist, supra note 77, at 154–55 (discussing how defendants value 
KATBI V11 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2014  11:37 AM 
116 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 31:1 
representation;88 memory problems surrounding the alleged crime;89 
mental illness;90 a lack of discovery;91 attorney workloads and 
resources;92 risk and loss aversion;93 defendant demographics;94 and 
most pertinently, the valuation of collateral consequences. These 
distorting factors may further distance actual guilt from the defendant’s 
willingness to plead guilty.95 
While these insidious variables warp the plea bargaining calculus, 
defendants are still eager to plea. The eagerness comes from a desire for 
finality; while going to trial presents uncertainty and the threat of 
harsher punishment, plea bargains “barter away [the] chance for 
acquittal for a lower but more certain sentence.”96 Because many people 
are loss averse, they prefer a certain smaller loss to the chance of a larger 
loss.97 A loss-averse defendant prefers a one hundred percent chance of 
a one-year punishment over a fifty percent chance of a two-year 
punishment.98 Furthermore, innocent defendants are even more loss-
averse than guilty defendants.99 Certain cases are also harder to prove, 
regardless of the defendant’s underlying factual guilt.100 Given these 
incentives, the aforementioned confounding variables, and the 
prevalence of plea bargaining regardless of factual guilt, the 
prosecutorial menu must be flexibly and smoothly structured to account 
for plea-bargaining distortions and to match negotiation needs. 
On top of these psychological and logistical factors that distort 
plea-bargaining calculus, the recidivist statutes in Alaska exacerbate 
plea-bargaining problems. Only smoothly graduated punishment 
 
their liberty interests). 
 85.  Id. (quoting Bibas, supra note 24, at 2496). 
 86.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2464. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 
2302–03 (2006). 
 89.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2531. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See Stuntz, supra note 79, at 2555 (discussing the difficulties faced by 
underfunded law enforcement agencies). 
 93.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2464. 
 94.  Id. at 2511–12. 
 95.  Gilchrist, supra note 77, at 146–48 (discussing a situation in which an 
innocent defendant nonetheless chose to plead guilty). 
 96.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2507. 
 97.  Id. at 2508. 
 98.  See id. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have found people are loss 
adverse and typically “would prefer a certainty of losing $50 to a 50 percent 
chance of losing $100.” Id. 
 99.  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 24. 
 100.  Covey, supra note 71, at 82. 
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options will allow for smooth, efficient plea negotiations—negotiations 
that can seamlessly react to the shadows of trial and variations in 
evidence.101 
Instead, the Alaska Statutes create massive cliffs with their 
recidivist sentencing structure. The shadow of trial is formed around the 
felony conviction for recidivism, its enhanced incarceration period, and 
its collateral consequences. Any plea-bargaining that takes place will be 
forced to vacillate between that harsh felony punishment and the lesser 
misdemeanor sentence. By creating a cliff between the felony recidivist 
offense and the stand-alone misdemeanor violation, Alaska has caused 
the prosecutor and defendant have no middle ground on which to meet. 
Precisely quantifying the cliff effect is made even more difficult by 
the imprecise valuation of felony collateral consequences. While most 
recidivist increases operate within their offense spectrum, where 
misdemeanors remain misdemeanors and felonies remain felonies,102 
shifting between a misdemeanor and a felony brings about not only 
increased incarceration, but new felony collateral consequences. 
Quantifying these consequences, which are not numerical in nature, is 
difficult for both parties in plea negotiations, and both parties already 
suffer from several obfuscating effects. This exacerbates the already 
intimidating cliff effect, adding an extra layer of complication and 
(potentially mis-)calculation to the plea-bargaining calculus. 
Given these distant and obscure posts on which the negotiations 
must be anchored, defendants will likely pool into three categories. 
When prosecutors have very strong cases, they will likely not bother 
with the misdemeanor offer; when they have very weak cases, they 
would likely bargain at or below the misdemeanor level anyway. The 
massive cliff between the full charge and any possible bargain creates 
gross inefficiencies for those mid-level defendants with average cases or 
inconclusive evidence. The prosecutor is thus likely limited to those two 
distant landmarks, regardless of the variations in case strength among 
this enlarged middle class. 
This structure causes several problems. The first group, holding the 
prosecutor’s strongest cases, will now be forced to trial more frequently 
because the stand-alone misdemeanor punishment is too lenient a 
bargain in the prosecutor’s eyes. The raw increase in trials will lead to a 
natural increase in acquittals as well, even though these defendants are 
 
 101.  See Bibas, supra note 24, at 2535 (“While determinate sentencing is less 
uncertain than indeterminate sentencing, it risks being lumpy. If we wanted plea 
bargaining to work like a smooth, efficient market, we would have to iron out its 
rigidity and lumps.”). 
 102.  E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 666.5, 667, 1170 (West 2011). 
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often the most culpable. This will also reduce the number of cases that 
plead out. The increase in tried cases will increase the costs of litigation 
imposed on the state and stretch the resources of prosecutor and 
defender offices beyond their current level.103 
The second group, holding middling levels of evidence, will 
increase in size but decrease in negotiation efficiency. The most risk-
averse defendants will take the stand-alone misdemeanor plea because it 
is the only offer they can get. They can easily be coerced into accepting 
misdemeanor charges, given the risks and costs of felony punishment 
and collateral consequences. To avoid a potentially massive loss, even 
innocent defendants could take pleas.104 Their natural loss aversion 
encourages taking the plea to lock down an acceptable and certain 
sentence instead of rolling the dice at trial.105 Many more defendants will 
present cases that may deserve harsher punishment than the stand-alone 
misdemeanor provides, but are not worth taking to trial because the 
evidence is not strong enough for the prosecutor. These defendants will 
quickly accept the stand-alone misdemeanor bargain, as they are getting 
a great deal given the potential punishment at trial. In essence, the 
sentencing differentials leave many of these mid-level defendants with 
no choice but to plea, despite their case strength (or lack thereof).106 
The final group, holding the prosecutor’s weakest cases, will be 
mostly unaffected because they will almost always be bargaining at or 
below the stand-alone offense, given their low chance of conviction at 
trial. 
In summary, heavy top-end penalties without smooth surrounding 
gradations will not allow prosecutors to efficiently negotiate bargains. 
Defendants will be stuck with lumpy offers, and they will pool together 
regardless of the variations in their groups. Not only does this stretch 
the resources of the litigants, acquit a larger number of strong cases, and 
expose weak and innocent defendants to harsh penalties and plea deals, 
but it also degrades the burden of proof for the large class of middling 
defendants.107 
 
 103.  Stuntz, supra note 79, at 2554–56. 
 104.  See Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 630 
(2005) (“[B]argaining promotes false guilty pleas[.]”); Covey, supra note 71, at 82 
(“Cases that turn on a confident witness’s identification, for example, may look 
quite strong to a jury but include a large proportion of actually innocent 
defendants.”). 
 105.  Bibas, supra note 24, at 2507. 
 106.  See Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 
224–25 (2006) (discussing the problems with the current state of plea bargains in 
the American justice system). 
 107.  See id. at 230–31 (telling the tale of an eighty-eight dollar forgery earning 
KATBI V11 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2014  11:37 AM 
2014 CLASSIFYING RECIDIVIST OFFENSES 119 
The mid-level defendants averse to the intimidating felony charges 
will plea to lesser offenses at extremely high rates. The mid-level 
defendants with damning cases who nonetheless get a bargain offer will 
take it with haste. Thus, the predominant burden of proof becomes 
probable cause.108 Probable cause is the standard that most prosecutors 
must meet when leveling formal criminal charges.109 It is not necessary 
for a prosecutor to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt to issue 
formal charges, offer a plea bargain, and secure a guilty plea.110 When 
the prosecutor’s only options are to initiate stand-alone misdemeanor 
offenses or felony recidivist charges, the disparate penalties drive 
bargains in a large number of the middle class of defendants. Given the 
increased incentive to plead (increased from an already high rate), the 
standard of proof so revered in our constitutional system is reduced to 
mere probable cause.111 This erosion away from the reasonable doubt 
standard is of great harm to the criminal justice system: 
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime 
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on 
factual error . . . . Accordingly, a society that values the good 
name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a 
man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt 
about his guilt . . . . [T]he reasonable-doubt standard is 
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the 
community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that 
the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard 
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are 
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that 
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have 
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a 
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his 
guilt with utmost certainty.112 
 
a recalcitrant defendant life in prison). See also Stuntz, supra note 79 
(“[P]rosecutors [may] threaten the death penalty in cases in which they have no 
desire to impose it, as a means of getting better plea bargains.”). 
 108.  Gilchrist, supra note 77, at 153 (“Where the government has: (a) probable 
cause to bring a series of charges with significantly disparate penalties, and (b) 
discretion to select among those charges, then the effective burden of proof to 
secure a conviction can be reduced to as little as probable cause.”). 
 109.  Langer, supra note 106, at 261 n.146 (2006). 
 110.  Id. at 260–61. 
 111.  Gilchrist, supra note 77, at 153. 
 112.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (internal citations omitted). 
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B.  Proportionality 
The Eighth Amendment doctrine of proportionality113 has long 
been the subject of academic analysis, but it has been infrequently used 
to decide cases.114 The Supreme Court first invalidated a sentence on 
proportionality grounds in 1910.115 Since then, use of the proportionality 
principle to invalidate non-capital sentences has been exceedingly rare 
and quite muddled—the primary cases116 have provided more 
uncertainty than clarity.117 
Proportionality challenges ask when an otherwise constitutional 
punishment is “so ‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate’ in relation to the 
crime for which they are imposed that [it becomes] unconstitutional.”118 
Weems v. United States held that the “punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to offense” and struck down a non-capital 
sentence.119 Many years after Weems, Solem v. Helm120 enunciated a 
proportionality test. First, the Court required a comparison of “the 
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty . . . in light of the 
harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of 
 
 113.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 
(1962) (holding that the the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 114.  See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 
91 VA. L. REV. 677, 688 (2005) (“Between 1910, when Weems was decided, and 
1972, when the Court decided Furman v. Georgia, the Weems principle of 
proportionality—that the Eighth Amendment barred disproportionate 
sentences—was rarely cited by the Court.”). 
 115.  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 116.  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. 321 (1998); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 117.  See Joshua R. Pater, Struck Out Looking: Continued Confusion in Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Review After Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 
(2003), 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 407–10 (2003) for an overview of the 
continuing problems in fairly applying the Eighth Amendment. Alaska has seen 
only a small number of cases that raise this issue. However, the courts have 
interpreted the Alaska Constitution in a similar manner to the U.S. Constitution, 
finding that it prevents punishments that are “so disproportionate to the offense 
committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice.” 
Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 635 (Alaska 1977) (quoting Green v. State, 390 
P.2d 433, 435 (Alaska 1964)). See also McNabb v. State, 860 P.2d 1294, 1298 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (discussing whether or not fines imposed on a fisherman 
were excessive). Since the U.S. Constitution establishes the baseline for rights in 
this context and the Alaska courts have interpreted the U.S. and Alaska 
Constitutions similarly, the following analysis focuses on the federal 
constitutional right. 
 118.  Lee, supra note 114, at 679. 
 119.  Id. at 687–88 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367). 
 120.  463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
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the offender.”121 Second, the Court stated that “it may be helpful to 
compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction” to see whether “more serious crimes are subject to the same 
penalty, or to less serious penalties.”122 Third, the Court suggested that 
“courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”123 
The Court softened Solem’s full test in Harmelin v. Michigan.124 In 
Harmelin, the first weighing step remained, but the jurisdictional 
comparisons that composed the second and third steps became wholly 
discretionary.125 Finally, in Ewing v. California,126 the court declared that a 
“sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, 
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation”127 and that it is “enough” that 
the state has a “reasonable basis for believing” that its punishment 
“advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial 
way.”128 
In essence, what started as an inter- and intra-jurisdictional test that 
examined the gravity of crimes and punishments was neutered, now 
calling for almost complete deference to the legislature when weighing 
the gravity of the punishment to the offense.129 There are reasons for 
this: differences in non-capital punishments can arise from judicial 
discretion, sentencing preferences, and penological ideals.130 
Administering a robust non-capital proportionality doctrine could also 
prove unwieldy given the sheer number of non-capital cases courts 
encounter.131 Finally, deference to the state legislature honors federalism 
ideals.132 
Alaska’s provisions must be put to the “gravity” test. By itself, the 
original misdemeanor charges would result in up to a one-year 
 
 121.  Id. at 290–92. 
 122.  Id. at 291. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 125.  Id. at 1005; Lee, supra note 114, at 731–32 (recounting the Harmelin 
decision). 
 126.  538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 127.  Id. at 25. 
 128.  Id. at 28. 
 129.  See Lee, supra note 114, at 681–82, 693–96 (providing an overview of the 
historical development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 130.  Julia Fong Sheketoff, State Innovations in Noncapital Proportionality 
Doctrine, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2209, 2215–16 (2010). 
 131.  Id. at 2216–17. 
 132.  Id. at 2217 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has asserted that a weak noncapital 
doctrine is necessary to ensure an appropriate level of deference to state 
legislative policymaking.”). 
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sentence.133 With the upgraded felony offense, a presumptive sentence 
of up to two years is applied, in addition to felony consequences.134 This 
creates a one hundred percent increase in incarceration and tacks on 
collateral consequences long after the sentence has been served. In 
misdemeanors related to driving under the influence, many other states 
apply a felony reclassification to an inherent misdemeanor violation.135 
 
 133.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135 (2011). 
 134.  § 12.55.125. The sentence can rise up to five years of incarceration, 
depending on criminal history. Id. 
 135.  See ALA. CODE §§ 32-5A-191(e)–(h) (1983) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated 
to felony at fourth offense in five year window); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-
1382–1383 (2012) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to felony at third offense); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 5-65-111–112 (West 2013) (fourth DUI offense is a felony, fewer 
offenses not classified); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227a, 53a-25–26 (West 2013) (DUI 
misdemeanor aggravated to felony at fourth offense in five-year window); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 4177(d), 4177B(e)(2) (West 2013) (DUI misdemeanor 
aggravated to felony at third offense); FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (West 2013) (DUI 
misdemeanor aggravated to felony at third offense in ten-year window); HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 291E-61, 291E-61.5 (West 2013) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to 
felony at fourth offense); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8004C–80005 (West 2013) 
(Blood Alcohol Content greater than .2 aggravated from misdemeanor to felony 
at third offense); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (West 2013) (DUI misdemeanors 
aggravated to a felony at third offense); IOWA CODE § 321J.2 (West 2011) (DUI 
misdemeanor aggravated to felony at third offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567 
(West 2013) (DUI nonperson misdemeanor aggravated to nonperson felony at 
third offense); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.020(5) (West 2010) (BAC greater than 
.18 misdemeanor aggravated to felony at third offense); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:98 (2013) (uncategorized first and second offenses for DUI, third offense 
either a misdemeanor or felony, a felony at the fourth offense); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 274 § 1, ch. 90 § 24 (West 2014) (third DUI offense is a felony, prior offenses 
unclassified); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625 (West 2013) (DUI misdemeanor 
aggravated to felony at third offense in ten year window); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-
11-30 (West 2014) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to felony at third offense); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 302.321 (West 2011) (misdemeanor of driving on canceled, revoked, 
or suspended license aggravated to a felony at fourth offense); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 61-8-714, 61-8-731 (West 2013) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to a 
felony at fourth offense); NEB. REV. STAT. §60-6,196(1) (West 2013) (fourth DUI 
offense within twelve years aggravates misdemeanor to felony); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 484C.400 (West 2009) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to a felony at third 
offense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:18 (2013) (non-injury driving while 
intoxicated misdemeanor aggravated to felony at fourth offense); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 66-8-102 (West 2010) (fourth DUI offense classified as a felony, prior 
offenses not classified); N.Y. V. & T. LAW § 1193 (McKinney 2013) (driving while 
impaired misdemeanor aggravated to felony at second offense within ten years); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-138.5 (West 2006) (impaired driving fourth offense is a 
felony, prior offenses are level 1–5 offenses); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 813.010 (West 
2013) (DUI misdemeanors aggravated to a felony at fourth offense); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 32-23-2–4 (2013) (DUI misdemeanor aggravated to felony at 
third offense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09 (DUI misdemeanor 
aggravated to felony at third offense in ten years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503 
(West 2013) (first two offenses within six years are class B misdemeanors, third 
and subsequent offenses within ten years are third degree felonies); WYO. STAT. 
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This certainly weighs against the inter-jurisdictional prong of the test 
outlined in Solem v. Helm.136 In addition, North Carolina’s felony charge 
only gives the defendant a presumptive sentence of four to six months, 
not two years.137 Within Alaska, the felony reclassification is limited to 
assault, vehicle theft, and DUI.138 No other Class A misdemeanors are 
subject to the same recidivist reclassifications. 
Given the current state of non-capital proportionality doctrine, 
however, any proportionality challenges to the Alaskan recidivist 
provisions are likely to fall on deaf ears. Although the felony 
consequences and incarceration periods are certainly heavy,139 the broad 
deference given to state legislatures will likely defeat any claims against 
the punishment. Many penological theories satisfied the Ewing Court,140 
and Alaska’s legislature spent considerable time discussing the need for 
deterrence and incapacitation.141 Comparative jurisdictional analysis 
weighs against the provisions—Alaska, Florida, and North Carolina are 
the only states this Author is aware of to broadly apply felony charges 
based on misdemeanor recidivism alone, and even North Carolina’s 
application is significantly more lenient than Alaska’s.142 However, this 
prong of the test is wholly discretionary after Harmelin.143 Although 
Alaska only applies the felony reclassification to a few misdemeanors, 
this will most likely be chalked up to state needs and legislative 
deference.144 
 
ANN. § 31-5-233 (West 2013) (non-injury DUI offenses are misdemeanors, fourth 
or subsequent offenses within five years are felonies). 
 136.  463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 137.  See NORTH CAROLINA FELONY PUNISHMENT CHART (2011), supra note 17 
(recommending a presumptive range of four to six months). 
 138.  See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. See also Julia L. Torti, 
Accounting for Punishment in Proportionality Review, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1909, 1909–
10 (2013) (“Though courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment to offer more 
expansive protection in specific contexts, such as for certain offenders facing the 
death penalty, individuals serving term-of-years sentences very rarely get relief 
under the Eighth Amendment.”); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: 
The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009) (“In noncapital cases . . . the Court has done 
virtually nothing to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.”). 
 140.  See Lee, supra note 114, at 681–82 (discussing the Ewing decision). 
 141.  House Bill 30, ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 25th Leg. (Feb. 8, 2008) 
(statement of Anna Fairclough, Alaska House of Representatives). Other 
representatives, including Gerald Luckhaupt and Peggy Brown, also discussed 
recidivism and deterrence. Id. 
 142.  Compare NORTH CAROLINA FELONY PUNISHMENT CHART (2011), supra note 
17 (giving a sentence with a presumptive range of four to six months), with 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2011) (giving a sentence of up to five years). 
 143.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991). 
 144.  See Lee, supra note 114, at 694–95 (outlining the role of state’s interests in 
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Without clear guidance on non-capital proportionality, any 
proportionality claims will likely be denied. There have been calls for an 
improvement in non-capital proportionality jurisprudence.145 Some have 
also voiced dissatisfaction with the state of the proportionality 
doctrine146 and calls for its use as a limit on state power.147 A 
proportionality challenge to recidivist sentencing may give the courts an 
opportunity to hash out the non-capital proportionality doctrine. 
However, the current jurisprudence’s deferential, muddled state 
suggests that a challenge to recidivist sentencing on proportionality 
grounds will likely fail. 
C.  Double Jeopardy 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects 
persons from being put in legal jeopardy twice for the same offense.148 
The Double Jeopardy Clause is founded on the constitutionally 
embedded ideal that “the State with all its resources and power should 
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for 
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity.”149 Alaskan courts have consistently enforced this federal 
right.150 
Increased penalties for recidivists have always existed in 
sentencing.151 However, the Double Jeopardy Clause must be consulted 
when recidivist increases appear because recidivists have already been 
punished once for their crimes; to base a defendant’s new punishment 
on those past crimes may punish him twice for the past offenses.152 “If 
 
the Ewing decision). 
 145.  See id. at 679–81 (critiquing non-capital proportionality jurisprudence). 
 146.  See generally Lee, supra note 114 (providing an overview of the problems 
facing proportionality jurisprudence). 
 147.  Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 
DUKE L.J. 263, 265–66, 268–69 (2005). 
 148.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) 
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment against the States). 
 149.  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 150.  See, e.g., Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 310 (Alaska 1970) (holding that 
Alaska’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy prevents one from 
receiving multiple prison sentences for the same offenses”); Rofkar v. State, 305 
P.3d 356, 358–59 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (applying a double jeopardy analysis in 
an Alaska court). 
 151.  See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998) 
(discussing the rationale and history underlying increased sentences for 
recidivists). 
 152.  See also Russell, supra note 6, at 1151 (2010) (“One can argue, however, 
that a defendant’s status as a recidivist should not affect a measure of the 
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problems of double jeopardy are to be avoided in the very concept of 
increased punishment for recidivists, the notion that recidivism is a 
distinct crime must be rejected.”153 To avoid this predicament, courts 
have held that recidivist enhancements are not separate substantive 
punishments but aggravating factors prompting increased 
punishments.154 Categorizing recidivist provisions as sentence 
enhancements rather than separate substantive offenses has allowed 
courts to deny double jeopardy challenges to recidivist statutes.155 These 
recidivist aggravations exist in all states and the federal criminal 
system,156 and they have survived numerous attacks.157 
Recently however, some states have adopted separate substantive 
recidivist offenses.158 The misdemeanor recidivist statutes in these states 
do not merely enhance sentences as the distinction requires; rather, they 
are separate, unique offenses, whose only and essential elements are the 
previous convictions themselves.159 North Carolina courts have resisted 
this conclusion by misconstruing these separate offenses as mere 
enhancements, falling in line with previous categorization, and claiming 
that the enhancement status disposes of double jeopardy inquiries.160 
 
seriousness of the crime committed or what the appropriate punishment for that 
offense should be. Regardless of whether an offender committed previous 
offenses, the seriousness of an offense should depend only on the seriousness of 
the illicit act.”). 
 153.  Dubroff, supra note 66, at 340. 
 154.  See White, supra note 5, at 122 (“Courts have developed a fictional 
distinction between actual punishment and enhancement of punishment in 
order to rationalize the constitutionality of recidivist statutes. Courts apply this 
distinction to conclude that increased punishment authorized by recidivist 
statutes does not punish a defendant for crimes previously committed.”). See also 
Dubroff, supra note 66, at 332 (“The statutes have been sustained on the theory 
that a recidivist is not punished for having committed the earlier crimes; rather, 
he is punished more severely for the present offense because his prior 
convictions have imparted a status to him which aggravates his guilt for any 
subsequent crimes he may commit.”). 
 155.  See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1967) (listing numerous 
cases that were tried and failed on these grounds). 
 156.  White, supra note 5. 
 157.  See Spencer, 385 U.S. at 560–61 (listing cases in multiple jurisdictions 
where the use of recidivist aggravations were challenged but upheld). 
 158.  See supra note 135 (listing states with aggravating factor statutes). 
 159.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2010) (“A person guilty of violating this 
section is guilty of a Class H felony.”). 
 160.  See State v. Vardiman, 552 S.E.2d 697, 700–01 (2001) (“Relying on Priddy, 
this Court in Smith also held North Carolina General Statutes section 14-33.2, the 
habitual misdemeanor assault statute, to be a substantive offense and not 
‘merely a status.’ . . . However, in determining whether the habitual 
misdemeanor assault statute withstood constitutional scrutiny in regard to the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, the fact that the statute was a sentence 
enhancement statute, not the fact that it was a substantive offense, was 
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Because mere enhancements have been declared consistent with the 
Double Jeopardy Clause—they only increase punishment by 
aggravating guilt—misconstruing the statutes in this way has so far 
shielded them from Double Jeopardy attacks.161 However, predicating 
the offenses purely on the past convictions may violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because these are not mere enhancements—they are 
separate substantive offenses that stand alone as independent and 
unique charges and can be brought against the defendant like any other 
offense.162 The only and essential elements in these statutes are the 
existence of the prior convictions.163 Such specific, stand-alone offenses 
are inherently different from the mere sentence enhancements and twice 
put a defendant in jeopardy.164 
Alaska’s misdemeanor recidivist enhancements are framed slightly 
differently. Initially, the statutes seem to operate as simple 
enhancements, upgrading inherent misdemeanor offenses to felonies.165 
However, the recidivist statutes break through the felony/misdemeanor 
distinction based on recidivism alone, morphing the original offense 
from a misdemeanor infraction to a newly minted felony. The previous 
convictions are the only and essential elements that transform the 
original misdemeanor violation into a new felony offense; those prior 
convictions subject the defendant to an offense that would otherwise not 
exist. Although not as clear-cut as the separate offenses in other states,166 
the analogy can be drawn: Alaska’s recidivist provisions could be 
framed as new, separate offenses whose essential elements include the 
past convictions. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that “our cases have recognized 
three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
 
dispositive.”); White, supra note 5, at 122 (downplaying double jeopardy 
challenges by treating prior crimes as sentence enhancements rather than as 
independent or new punishment for old crimes). 
 161.  See State v. Carpenter, 573 S.E.2d 668, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), cert. 
denied, 577 S.E.2d 896 (N.C. 2003) (defending recidivist aggravators as sentence 
enhancements and not ex post punishment of previously tried crimes); State v. 
Smith, 533 S.E.2d 518, 520–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing challenge that 
aggravators are ex post facto punishment for prior conduct but rather 
punishment for current conduct to a greater degree). 
 162.  White, supra note 5, at 122. 
 163.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2010) (defining the crime as “a person 
guilty of violating this section is guilty of a Class H felony”). 
 164.  White, supra note 5, at 122. 
 165.  See supra notes 11–15 (upgrading assault, theft, vehicle theft, and DUI). 
 166.  Compare supra notes 11–15 (listing aggravating factor statutes in Alaska), 
with supra note 135 (listing aggravating factor statutes in other states). 
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conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense.”167 
Without the past offenses, the defendant has been convicted of conduct 
that is only a misdemeanor violation; the past convictions alone allow 
prosecutors to charge defendants with a new felony offense.168 Thus, the 
recidivist increases available in Alaska are not mere sentence 
enhancements that only apply at sentencing.169 Rather, they are new 
substantive offenses that cannot be afforded the protections that Double 
Jeopardy jurisprudence makes available to mere sentence 
enhancements.170 The new felony offenses in Alaska bring a second 
punishment for a previous offense in a separate, substantive way, and 
violate Double Jeopardy protections. 
However, courts have been loath to invalidate any recidivist 
statutes on double jeopardy grounds.171 While the 
enhancement/separate-offense distinction may be a workable legal test, 
courts have performed judicial gymnastics to avoid it.172 Given the 
overly broad classification of all recidivist provisions as sentence 
enhancements (despite the stand-alone statutes and their analogies that 
exist in some states),173 successful constitutional challenges on double 
jeopardy grounds seem unlikely. However, if courts begin to 
acknowledge the distinction, stand-alone recidivist provisions will face 
 
 167.  Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1984). See also 
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873) (“If there is anything settled in the 
jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully 
punished for the same offence. And though there have been nice questions in the 
application of this rule to cases in which the act charged was such as to come 
within the definition of more than one statutory offence, or to bring the party 
within the jurisdiction of more than one court, there has never been any doubt of 
its entire and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is 
proposed.”). 
 168.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(6) (2011) (aggravating a charge of 
theft to theft in the second degree where convict has history of recidivism). 
 169.  § 11.41.220(a)(5); supra note 12. See also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 
728 (1998) (finding that double jeopardy protections may not apply at 
sentencing). 
 170.  See Monge, 524 U.S. at 728 (“Nor have sentence enhancements been 
construed as additional punishment for the previous offense[.]”); Witte v. 
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1995) (holding the use of evidence of a 
related crime to enhance the sentence of a separate crime within the statute does 
not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
 171.  See supra Section II.C; Nathan H. Seltzer, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The 
Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U. 
L. REV. 921, 931–32 (2003) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly upheld recidivism 
statutes ‘against contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing 
with double jeopardy . . . .’”). 
 172.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy As A 
Limit on Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 66–69 (2011) (rejecting both 
classifications of recidivist enhancements). 
 173.  E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2013). 
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constitutional attacks. 
III. SMOOTHING THE PUNISHMENT LANDSCAPE:  
A SOLUTION 
Constitutional challenges are notoriously difficult. Given the state 
of affairs in proportionality and double jeopardy jurisprudence, 
challenges on these grounds are unlikely to succeed. However, a much 
easier path is available: legislative reform. The legislatures have the 
opportunity to improve the prosecutorial menu and their recidivist 
provisions to greater serve the needs of their criminal justice systems 
while honoring the foundational rights established in the Constitution. 
To correct the concerns outlined in this article, the Alaska 
legislature should modify the recidivist provisions to parallel the federal 
guidelines and their criminal history adjustments.174 To smooth out the 
prosecutorial menu, recidivist provisions should offer increasing 
enhancements as the number of previous convictions increases, starting 
with the second conviction. These increases should start small and grow 
with each additional offense. The felony upgrade should be entirely 
removed, or at least postponed for several enhancements. The 
prosecutor should have the discretion to apply or ignore the 
enhancements when bringing the charges and negotiating plea 
agreements. 
Structuring the prosecutorial menu in this way will reduce the 
plea-bargaining problems associated with lumpy sentencing options; 
assuage any proportionality concerns by keeping misdemeanors 
classified as misdemeanors for the majority, if not all, of the offenders; 
securely establish the statutes under the enhancement category of 
double jeopardy analysis; and reduce overall costs on the state budgets. 
Creating a smooth punishment curve will facilitate smooth 
settlement curves. Instead of creating cliffs between the felony recidivist 
charge and the stand-alone misdemeanor infraction, the series of 
graduated enhancements can provide for a wide range of sentencing 
options during plea negotiations and at trial. Such a statute could 
provide for increasing recidivist enhancements that add to the 
punishment through step-by-step increases in incarceration. This wide 
range, split over many steps, would be tacked onto the stand-alone 
misdemeanor offense, allowing the parties to tailor a plea bargain in 
smaller increments to fit varying evidence levels and trial shadows. If 
the offender’s criminal history reaches the felony offense levels, the 
 
 174.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2013) (listing 
adjustments to sentences based on criminal history). 
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incarceration could be kept the same as the previous maximum 
misdemeanor level, while introducing the felony collateral 
consequences. This would mitigate the imprecision of quantifying the 
collateral consequences and keep the punishment curves smooth. This 
can lead to more efficient negotiation, more appropriate sentencing, and 
dispose of the problems of lumpiness and rigidity in the prosecutorial 
menu. Furthermore, this allows for cases brought to trial to experience 
the same tailoring by the court if a conviction arises. 
In response to Alaska’s relatively high recidivism rates, there have 
been calls to make more sentencing options available to prosecutors.175 
Most prominently, Senate Bill 64 proposes the creation of an Alaska 
Sentencing Commission.176 The Commission’s major goal would be to 
propose penal changes that would both save the state money and reduce 
recidivism rates.177 While primarily economically motivated, the 
measure shows that giving prosecutors more flexibility is a desired 
result in the Alaskan justice system.178 Studies support the idea and call 
for more sentencing options because of the increased effectiveness that 
programs other than longer sentences, such as electronic monitoring, 
and substance abuse treatment during incarceration periods, have at 
reducing recidivism rates.179 Offering prosecutors these alternatives 
would be less expensive, more effective, and more constitutionally 
sound than the recidivist penalty scheme currently in place. 
By keeping the first few increases at the misdemeanor level, it 
certainly side-steps any proportionality challenge, especially given the 
reluctance of any court to apply non-capital proportionality review to 
punishments. Following Ewing v. California,180 recidivist sentences in 
 
 175.  See, e.g., Matt Buxton, Recidivism Down, Treatment Up for Alaska Convicts, 
Officials Say, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.newsminer.com/news/local_news/recidivism-down-treatment-
up-for-alaska-convicts-officials-say/article_00a29ee4-46c2-11e3-bba0-
0019bb30f31a.html (detailing options other than increased incarceration to deal 
with Alaska’s recidivism problem). See also Editorial, Prison Problems: Reduced 
Recidivism Would Fight Against Rising Costs, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Mar. 27, 2013, 12:15 
AM), http://juneauempire.com/opinion/2013-03-28/alaska-editorial-prison-
problems-reduced-recidivism-would-fight-against-rising (calling for alternatives 
to reduce prison population, including reclassifying drug offenses as 
misdemeanors rather than felonies). 
 176.  S.B. 64, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2013). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  As of January 27, 2014, the Bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and has yet to return to the Senate Floor for discussion or debate. 
 179.  ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM, JUSTICE CENTER – UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA 
ANCHORAGE, FIVE YEAR PRISONER REENTRY STRATEGIC PLAN, 2011–2016 (2011), 
available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/28/2-3summerfall2011/d_ 
reentry.html. 
 180.  Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 12 (2003) (“In weighing the offense’s 
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such a mold will almost certainly withstand any proportionality 
challenge. By incorporating the recidivist provision strictly as a sentence 
enhancement, it will fall squarely under the enhancement distinction 
approved by the courts in double jeopardy jurisprudence. The 
elimination of the felony collateral consequences and the felony 
incarceration levels will reduce incarceration and post-incarceration 
supervision costs. Efficient plea negotiation will reduce trial costs and 
preserve litigant resources. 
CONCLUSION 
Recidivism is a major problem facing all jurisdictions, including 
Alaska. Increasing punishment based on criminal history is a popular 
attempt at controlling recidivism. However, when these increases are 
extreme or sudden, inefficiency arises in the plea bargaining and trial 
process and proportionality problems may arise. To avoid these 
problems, Alaska’s recidivist increases should be implemented 
immediately yet gradually, starting with the second repeated offense. 
This structure smoothes the prosecutorial landscape and assuages 
proportionality concerns. Recidivist increases must also be wary of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. So long as they are framed as sentence 
enhancements and not separate statutes, however, they will be upheld 
as constitutional. If Alaska molds a statute with these concerns in mind, 
it can achieve the goals of legislatures cheaply, efficiently, and 
proportionally while avoiding the constitutional and logistic difficulties 
currently present. 
 
gravity, both his current felony and his long history of felony recidivism must be 
placed on the scales. Any other approach would not accord proper deference to 
the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s choice of 
sanctions.”). 
